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Abstract 
Propensity score matching is used to estimate the size of the public sector pay premium in four countries. Three sets 
of matching covariates are used; worker characteristics only, then including job attributes and finally adding union 
membership. When worker characteristics and job attributes are controlled for, the public sector pay premium ranges 
from 30% in Canada to 19-20% in Australia and Great Britain and only 6% in the United States. Differences in job 
attributes between private sector and public sector workers make almost no difference to the estimated pay premium. 
But once differences in union membership across sectors are controlled for, the estimated public sector pay premium 
is reduced in all countries and disappears in Canada. This finding favors the hypothesis that the pay premium partially 
reflects rents accruing to public sector workers, obtained most probably with assistance from the actions of their labor 
unions.
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     1. Introduction 
Workers in the public sector typically are paid more than those in the private sector. Some of this 
pay gap reflects differences in characteristics, such as higher average education, but non-
competitive rents also may be accruing to public sector workers (Gregory and Borland, 1999). 
Such rents are possible because the public sector is now much more heavily unionized than the 
private sector (Visser, 2006) and public sector employers may not face the same hard budget 
constraint and competitive conditions that inhibit wage rises in many private firms. But it is also 
claimed that different job attributes account for much of the pay gap, at least in the U.K. (Bender 
and Elliott, 2002). This claim is contentious because many studies find better job attributes, such 
as greater job security and more generous pension schemes, for public sector workers (e.g., 
Poterba and Rueben, 1998). Compensating differentials should imply lower public sector pay to 
offset these more favorable job conditions. 
  To help inform this debate, this note reports propensity score matching (PSM) estimates of 
the public sector pay premium for Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the United States. 
Attention is restricted to these four English-speaking countries because previous evidence on 
wage differentials and sorting by worker quality across establishment sizes finds that sorting is 
mainly evident in English-speaking countries (Gibson and Stillman, 2009). Since establishments 
in the public sector are typically larger than those in the private sector (Belman and Heywood, 
1990) worker quality differences across sectors are also likely, especially in the English-speaking 
countries, making these countries the most interesting ones for testing explanations about public 
sector pay. 
  The data come from the 2005 ISSP Work Orientations survey. This survey is uniquely suited 
to this task since in addition to recording standard worker characteristics like age, education and 
gender it also records job attributes such as whether the job is secure, interesting, improves skills, 
causes stress or exhaustion, is dangerous, and so on. For employed respondents the survey also 
records whether they are currently members of a union. While the survey does not record 
establishment size, job attributes such as whether the worker feels that they can work 
independently may proxy for size of the workforce. 
  The strategy in this note is to report three sets of PSM estimates, first matching just on 
worker characteristics,
1 then also including these new measures of job attributes in the matching, 
and finally including union membership as a matching covariate. If the estimated public sector 
pay premium persists when comparing earnings of observationally similar public sector and 
private sector workers who are doing jobs with observationally similar attributes, it would tend 
to count against the claim that much of the pay gap is due to differences in job attributes. If the 
estimated premium then falls once union membership is added to the worker characteristics and 
job attributes in the set of matching covariates, it would support the claim that the pay premium 
partially reflects rents accruing to public sector workers, in this case through the actions of their 
labor unions. 
 
2. Data  Description 
ISSP surveys are carried out each year in approximately 30 countries, with a common core of 
questions asked of a probability-based, nationwide sample of 1000-2000 adults. An additional 
                                                 
1 Previous research on the public sector pay premium using ISSP data on worker characteristics is reported by 
Gregory and Borland (1999). Those estimates come from OLS regressions which is more prone to self-selection bias 
than PSM, at least if selection is based on observables.  
2 
 
rotating module of the survey changes topic each year, with the work orientations module that 
records job attributes last asked in 2005. The job attributes are measured using five-point Likert 
scales. Previous international comparisons of the public sector pay premium have used ISSP data 
(Gregory and Borland, 1999) but only from the core questionnaire that records worker 
characteristics but not job attributes. 
  A description of the variables measuring worker characteristics, job attributes and union 
membership is reported in Table 1. The sample is restricted to those respondents that were 
working for pay at the time of the 2005 survey. There are a number of significant differences 
between public sector workers and private sector workers in the reported variables. In all four 
countries the public sector workers have significantly more years of education and are less likely 
to be male. Public sector workers are also older but only significantly so in Australia. 
A consistent pattern in all four countries is that public sector workers consider their jobs 
more secure and also consider them as more helpful to others and more useful to society (in each 
case as evaluated by the worker themselves). Except for Canada, the public sector workers are 
significantly more likely to consider their job interesting and that it helps to improve their skills. 
In both Australia and the United States, public sector workers are significantly less likely to 
report that their job involves hard physical work. Offsetting these positive attributes of jobs, 
public sector workers outside of Great Britain report that they are significantly less able to work 
independently, and in Great Britain and the United States that they are significantly more likely 
to find their job is stressful. 
The union membership rate is much higher in the public sector. In the United States only 9% 
of the private sector workers in the ISSP sample were current union members, and in the three 
other countries the private sector unionization rate ranged from 17-19%. In contrast, just over 
one-third of the ISSP employees in the public sector in the United States were current union 
members and approximately two-thirds were union members in the other three countries. The 
public sector unionization rate appears especially high in Canada, at 70.3%. 
The ISSP also asks respondents to report pre-tax yearly personal income from all sources. 
While there is no question on earnings, for the respondents who are currently working most of 
their annual personal income should come from labor earnings. The logarithm of annual income 
is therefore used as the proxy measure of pay in this study. This same proxy is used in other 
international comparative studies using ISSP data (e.g., Gregory and Borland, 1999). According 
to this proxy, the raw pay gap for working in the public sector averages 24.7% across the four 
countries, ranging from 32.5% in Canada to (a statistically insignificant) 8.3% in Great Britain.
2  
 
3.  Estimation Method and Specification 
Let  i Y1 and  i Y0  be the log annual earnings of a randomly chosen worker in two counterfactual 
situations of treatment  ) 1 ( = i T  and non-treatment ), 0 ( = i T  where the treatment in this case is 
working in the public sector. For a set of observable covariates,  i X  let  ) ( i X P  be the propensity 
score, defined as:  ; ) 1 Pr( ) ( i i i X T X P = ≡  in this case the conditional probability of working in the 
public sector. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) can be estimated as: 
                                                 
2 This is calculated from the difference in the logarithm of pre-tax annual incomes. For example, for Canada this is 
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which is interpreted as the expected gain in log earnings for public sector workers (treatment 
group) compared with what they would have earned had they been in the private sector (non-
treatment group). Conceptually the ATT requires a mean for the unobservable counterfactual, 
[] 1 0 = i i T Y E  so for the observable quantities in equation (1) to identify the ATT relies on three 
key conditions introduced into the literature by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
  The first condition is that of “unconfoundedness” ( ) i i i i X T Y Y ⊥ 1 0 ,  where ⊥denotes 
independence. According to this, potential outcomes are independent of treatment, conditional on 
the observable covariates,  . i X  For example, in the case of the public sector pay premium, 
unconfoundedness implies that the odds of working in the public sector are unrelated to what 
earnings would be if the worker was not in the public sector, conditional on the observable 
covariates, . i X  
  Unconfoundedness is often expressed as a conditional independence assumption; given 
observable covariates, assignment to the treatment group is random. Hence, systematic 
differences in actual outcomes between treated and non-treated individuals with the same value 
of the covariates can be attributed to the treatment. The second condition is that of “common 
support” or overlap () , 1 ) 1 ( 0 < = < i i X T prob  so that for each  i X  a sufficiently large sample will 
yield observations for which we observe a  i Y0  and other observations for which we observe a 
. 1i Y  In other words, all treated individuals have a counterpart in the non-treatment group for each 
i X for which we seek to make a comparison.
3 
  The overlap condition seems to create dimensionality problems when many covariates are 
matched on; for example, if  i X contains k covariates which are all dichotomous the number of 
possible matches will be  . 2
k  But the propensity score reduces the dimensionality of the matching 
problem because it is possible to match on  ) ( i X P which is scalar, rather than on the vector of 
observable variables  . i X  Formally, the unconfoundedness and overlap conditions can be re-
expressed as () ) ( , 1 0 i i i i X P T Y Y ⊥  and ( ), 1 )) ( 1 ( 0 < = < i i X P T prob  so long as the “balancing” 
property  () ( ) () p X P T X prob p X P T X prob i i i i i i = = = = = ) ( , 0 ) ( , 1  holds (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983). In other words, conditional on the propensity score, the means of the covariates should be 
identical across the treatment and control groups if the balancing property holds. 
  Since the propensity score is a continuous variable it is unlikely that there are two 
observations with exactly the same value of  ), ( i X P  so further refinement is needed for 
equation (1) to be estimated. Therefore a “kernel matching” procedure is used, following Dehejia 
and Wahba (2002). With kernel matching, all treated individuals are matched with a weighted 
average of non-treated individuals, where the weights are inversely proportional to the distance 
                                                 
3 If there are regions where the support of Xi  does not overlap for the treated and non-treated groups, matching can 
only be performed over the common support region.  
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between propensity scores of the treated and non-treated. In addition, to show the robustness of 
the results a nearest-neighbor matching procedure is also used. 
  In summary, to implement the PSM estimates of the public sector pay premium, probit 
equations were estimated separately for each country in the sample. In each case the dependent 
variable was an indicator variable for whether the worker was employed in the public sector and 
the characteristics of the worker, job attributes and union membership are used as covariates (the 
full list is in Table 1). After the matching a “balancing” test is carried out. The treatment effects 
are then estimated over the region of common support using the method of kernel matching, with 
nearest-neighbor matching also used to provide some corroboration. Since the ISSP samples are 




4.   Results 
Table 2 contains the results of estimating equation (1) for each country, using three sets of 
covariates; just worker characteristics, then adding job attributes, and finally adding union 
membership.
5 In the first block of the table, where just worker characteristics are controlled for, 
the ATT of the expected gain in log earnings for a public sector worker compared to what they 
would have earned in the private sector ranges from 0.119 in Britain to 0.269 in Canada. The 
ATT estimates are statistically significant except in Britain, according to standard errors from 
500 bootstrap replications. Thus, matching on age, education, gender, marital status and location, 
the premium for working in the public sector is 30.9% in Canada, 25.2% in Australia and 16.6% 
in the United States. If nearest-neighbor matching is used the patterns are similar, although with 
slightly higher point estimates for Canada and the United States. 
  Expanding the matching so that job attributes are also included causes no change in the 
estimated premium in Canada, a slight fall in Australia and a higher but still statistically 
insignificant premium in Britain. Only in the United States does matching on job attributes cause 
the public sector pay premium to fall significantly.
6 That job attributes have so little impact does 
not reflect some lack of relevance since the attributes are jointly significant at the p<0.001 level 
in the probits used for the propensity scores. Rather it is that many attributes of public sector jobs 
are in some sense `better’ (e.g. being more secure, less of a dead-end, less physically demanding, 
etc) so matching on these does not reveal any compensating differentials in public sector pay. 
Indeed, in contrast to Bender and Elliot (2002) the addition of job attributes makes the 
unexplained public sector pay premium in Great Britain appear even larger (although surrounded 
by wide standard errors). 
  While job attributes do not have much impact on the estimated public sector pay premium, 
union membership does. The average treatment effects in the final block of Table 2 are lower for 
                                                 
4 Gregory and Borland (1999) also use pooled male and female sub-samples of ISSP to estimate earnings equations. 
5 Probits for the propensity scores and tests of the balancing property (holding in all cases) are available on request. 
Also available are the results of an indirect test of the unconfoundedness assumption, where the ATT is estimated 
for an outcome (family size) that is not expected to be affected by working in the public service, and this outcome is 
shown to be independent between the PSM treatment and control groups that are formed conditional on the 
covariates. 
6 There are also fewer control group observations in the common support, with up to 30% not used in the matching. 
This suggests that some private sector jobs are quite dissimilar to public sector jobs.  
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all four countries and for both matching estimators, compared with the middle block where the 
same covariates are used except for union membership. For example, the pay premium for public 
sector workers in Canada falls from 30.1% when the matching is on worker characteristics and 
job attributes to just 8.4% when the matching also includes current union membership. It is only 
in Australia that there remains a statistically significant public sector pay premium once 
differences in union membership across the public and private sector are controlled for. 
 
5. Conclusions 
When worker characteristics and job attributes are controlled for, the public sector pay premium 
ranges from 30% in Canada to 19-20% in Australia and Great Britain and only 6% in the United 
States. Ignoring differences in job attributes between private sector and public sector workers 
makes almost no difference to the estimated pay premium. That job attributes have so little 
impact suggests that higher pay in the public sector is not because of any compensating 
differentials. 
However the estimated public sector pay premium is reduced in all countries, and disappears 
in Canada, once differences in union membership across sectors are controlled for.  This finding 
favors the hypothesis that the pay premium partially reflects rents accruing to public sector 
workers, obtained most probably with assistance from the actions of their labor unions. 
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 Table 1: Average Characteristics of the Public Sector and Private Sector Workers, Job Attributes and Union Status in the Four Country Samples 
 Australia Canada Great  Britain United  States 
  Private Public Private  Public Private  Public Private  Public 
Log annual earnings  10.5347  10.7743**  10.5472  10.8284**  9.7361  9.8156  10.1868  10.4577** 
  (.7147) (.5221) (.7311) (.5098) (.7729) (.6942) (.9725)  (.6600) 
Years  of  schooling  14.5078 15.0673* 14.4972  15.2797**  12.8357 13.6441* 13.3295  14.9873** 
  (5.1802) (3.6042) (3.4122) (3.5659) (5.5552) (3.2358)  (2.899)  (3.0053) 
Age  42.2521  44.5625**  44.1583 45.5932 41.3811 42.7288 42.3067  42.8797 
  (12.7366) (10.3563) (11.6877) (10.6941) (12.1293) (10.573) (12.2441)  (11.3302) 
Male  .5308 .3846** .5417 .4322** .5140 .3559** .5595  .4051** 
  (.4994) (.4877)  (.499)  (.4975) (.5007) (.4808) (.4968)  (.4925) 
Married  .6731 .7115 .6861 .6610 .6748 .6864 .5057  .5949** 
  (.4694) (.4541) (.4647) (.4754) (.4693) (.4659) (.5004)  (.4925) 
Job attributes: (5-point scale where 1=agree or always and 5 = disagree or never) 
Job is secure  2.4487  2.0577** 2.4028 2.1610** 2.3706 2.1186** 2.2577  1.9241** 
  (1.0661) (1.0151) (1.1278) (1.0699)  (.9925)  (.9352)  (1.0628) (.981) 
Job  is  interesting  2.2618 2.0673** 2.0028  1.8983  2.2692 1.9237** 2.0294  1.7405** 
  (.9196) (.8599) (.8972) (.7995) (.9519) (.8076) (.9178)  (.9455) 
I can work independently  2.0265  2.1731**  1.7583  2.0508**  2.0594  2.1102  2.0359  2.1709* 
  (.7844) (.8563) (.7899) (.8458) (.8584) (.9677) (1.022)  (1.0356) 
My job can help other people  2.2111  1.8846**  1.9306  1.7458**  2.2552  1.5932**  1.876  1.5063** 
  (.9273) (.7716) (.8945) (.7418) (.9335) (.6437) (.8427)  (.6934) 
My job is useful to society  2.3353  1.7788**  2.1361  1.6949**  2.4720  1.678**  2.0408  1.4873** 
  (.9908) (.735) (.9387)  (.7791)  (1.0247)  (.8047)  (.9463)  (.7115) 
Job helps improve my skills  2.2400  1.9856**  2.1000  2.0339  2.3671  2.1017**  2.0277  1.7911** 
  (.9333) (.8596) (.9025) (.8666)  (.907)  (.9991) (.9398)  (.9447) 
Job has hard physical work  3.4885  3.9327**  3.6056  3.7966  3.5559  3.6695  3.3328  3.9494** 
  (1.2233) (1.0473) (1.2173) (1.1213) (1.2434) (1.1698) (1.4108)  (1.1554) 
Job is stressful  2.7358  2.7452 2.6917 2.5593 2.7762  2.6017* 2.7259  2.557* 
  (.88)  (.8209) (.957) (.9387)  (.8072)  (.8784)  (1.1143)  (.9936) 
Job is dangerous  4.0410  4.0048  3.9944  3.8305 4.1958 4.0254 3.9347  3.8861 
  (1.1167) (1.1229) (1.1121)  (1.157)  (.9859)  (1.1433) (1.2455)  (1.3161) 
Member of a union in my job  0.1894  0.5673**  0.1833  0.7034**  0.1678  0.6272**  0.0897  0.3481** 
  (0.3921) (0.4966) (0.3875) (0.4587) (0.3743) (0.4856) (0.2860)  (.04779) 
Sample  size  829 208 360 118 286 118 613  158 
Notes: Source is the 2005 ISSP Work Orientations survey. Samples in each country are those respondents that were working for pay at time of the survey. 
Standard deviations in parentheses.  






Table 2: Propensity Score Matching Estimates of the Public Sector Pay Premium in Four Countries 
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Australia 0.225  (0.046)  4.87  25.2%   92.7 0.229  (0.044) 
Canada 0.269  (0.064)  4.17  30.9%   99.2  0.306  (0.063) 
Great Britain  0.119  (0.086)  1.39  12.6%   96.9  0.101  (0.081) 
United States  0.154  (0.069)  2.24  16.6%   99.5  0.194  (0.105) 
  Worker characteristics + job attributes used to form propensity scores 
Australia 0.186  (0.050)  3.71  20.4%   86.4 0.212  (0.079) 
Canada 0.263  (0.077)  3.43  30.1%   75.6  0.257  (0.115) 
Great Britain  0.173  (0.115)  1.50  18.9%   70.6  0.207  (0.147) 
United States  0.061  (0.080)  0.76  6.3%   90.2  0.140  (0.119) 
  Worker characteristics + job attributes + union membership used to form propensity scores 
Australia 0.172  (0.055)  3.15  18.8%   89.0 0.171  (0.079) 
Canada 0.081  (0.073)  1.11  8.4%   78.3  0.096  (0.130) 
Great Britain  0.056  (0.138)  0.41  5.8%   62.6  0.118  (0.184) 
United States  0.001  (0.079)  0.00  0.1%   85.8  -0.025  (0.171) 
Note: The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is based on log annual income of ISSP-WO respondents working for pay at the 
time of the survey and only using observations that satisfy the common support assumption, with either kernel matching (ATTk) or 
nearest neighbor (ATTn) matching used. The percent pay premium is estimated as 100×[exp(ATT)-1]. The standard errors are obtained 
via 500 bootstrap replications. The covariates included in the sets of worker characteristics and job attributes are listed in Table 1 and 
also include dummy variables for region of residence within each country. 
 
 
 